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Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War both the EU and Security studies have been undergoing 
something of a transformation. For the EU, the end of the bipolar system was 
accompanied by institutional and rhetorical reform involving the deepening and 
widening of the Union. The narrative of Europe though had to change in terms of 
defining what had hitherto been externally defined limits, vis a vis the Eastern Bloc, 
to defining Europes role in what the first President Bush identified as a ‘New World 
Order’. The early results of this process were mixed, on the hand there were the 
successful transitions in central and Eastern Europe to market economies and Liberal 
democracies culminating in the ‘big bang’accession in 2004. While on the other there 
was the inability of the EU to act in concert to prevent the violence and ethnic 
cleansing in the Southern Balkans. Indeed, even the accession posed difficulties in 
terms of Europe’s identity as global actor with apparent division over the US decision 
to go to war in Iraq and the conduct of the War on Terror more generally. On the 
Security Studies side of the equation debates centred on the redefinition and 
broadening of the concept of security. In particular, though evident previously, a 
greater concern emerged with the constructed aspects of both security and security 
actors. Security practices, following Campbell, are performative, that is to say they 
play an active role in constructing the ‘selves’ which they claim to protect and indeed 
the ‘others’ whom are deemed threatening. This paper seeks to examine 21st century 
European security practices in order to examine what, if any, security identity is being 
constructed by the European Union. The first section of the paper discusses the 
relationship between intervention, sovereignty, security and identity. This is followed 
by a discussion of the development of and, indeed, the extent to which the EU can be 
said to have an emerging security identity or identitities. The final section discusses 
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these developments in light the recent EU led missions in Chad and the Gulf of Aden 
before concluding with a discussion of directions for further research. 
What is identity? 
 The term identity has proven to be a difficult and complex one to incorporate 
into analyses of the social world, and yet also an indispensable one. One’s identity is 
something which on the individual level one may feel quite certain about and yet it is 
difficult to define. Furthermore, the components of one’s identity are a complex mix 
of natural or brute facts such as race or biological sex and social facts both chosen and 
inherited such as religion, language, and even your favourite football team.1 One of 
the basic starting points for thinking about identity in contemporary social science is 
the assumption that: 
“our identities, whether group or individual, are not ‘natural facts’ about us, but 
are things we construct – fictions, in effect”2 
 
Although the term ‘fiction’ is provocative, and perhaps deliberately so, it does get at 
the heart of the socially constructed nature of identity. That is, even when based upon 
‘brute facts’ as markers of identity, the content and significance of identities only 
emerge through social interaction. The question is how then can we incorporate 
identity into our understanding of the social world in an intelligible and useful 
manner?  
 A common approach in the Discourse Theory literature has been to focus upon 
identity as being predicated on the articulation of difference. Such approaches are 
particularly focussed on the construction of binaries and the attendant normative 
implications outlined by Milliken above. Within the poststructuralist tradition identity 
                                                 
1
 See for discussion Alexander Wendt (1999) Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
2
 John E. Joseph (2005) Language and Identity London: Palgrave, p.6 
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is viewed as being both a product of and constitutive of political practice.3 The 
complexity of dealing with identity can be explained in terms of its inherent 
instability. As Waever has noted, with reference to Campbell: 
“These paradoxical features of identity stem from the general property that 
identities are never completely closed, never fully satiated, one is never simply 
that which one is.”4 
 
Identities then are conceived as social phenomena that are constituted “relationally 
and discursively”.5 They are a product of political practices but also act as a constraint 
on such practice in that they legitimate or make possible certain course of action or 
argument while excluding others.6 In relation to Foreign Policy practice this process 
of identity construction may involve a process of radical othering. Campbell argues 
that the US government has a need to construct and reconstruct US national identity 
through a process of radical othering where a rational, civilised self is threatened by a 
pathological, evil other that must be resisted as at all costs and that this drive to police 
the boundaries of identity is more relevant to the conduct of Foreign Policy than the 
existence of objective threats.7 Whereas for Campbell security is written in relation to 
an external enemy, Waever has argued that the ‘other’ may be temporal. For example, 
he argues that the EU is constructing its identity in relation to Europe’s own violent 
past: 
“ ‘Europe’ is not primarily built as a political category through nation-state 
imitating rhetorics of cultural identity and shared ancestry, but rather through a 
                                                 
3
 See for example David Campbell (1998) Writing Security Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press and William Connolly (2002) Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox 
, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
4
 Ole Waever “European Security Identities” in Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 No 1, 1996, 
p.115 
5
 Lene Hansen Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War Routledge, London, 
2006 p.37 
6
 This issue is often explored under what Milliken terms as the play of practice aimed at studying 
‘subgjugated knowledge’. That is knowledge that is excluded or rendered unintelligible in terms of a 
dominant or hegemonic discourse. See Jennifer Milliken (1999), ‘The Study of discourse in 
International Relations: A critique of research and methods’ European Journal of International 
Relations Vol 5 No 2, p. 230 
7
 See Campbell op. cit 1998 
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peculiar security argument. Europe’s past of wars and divisions is held up as the 
other to be negated, and on this basis it is argued that ‘Europe’ can only be if we 
avoid renewed fragmentation”8 
 
A third form of ‘othering’ has been outlined by Burke in relation to the beginnings of 
Australia as penal colony, a product of a desire to construct: 
“a healthy ‘Commonwealth’ against the virulent Other of the criminal, which 
could, it seemed, be excised from the social body like a cancer. Whether it be in 
the figure of the non-economic savage or the morally debased, criminal poor, 
the Other was already a vast, enabling shadow across Australia’s future.”9 
 
Critical here is the role that a process of ‘Othering’ is linked to the legitimation of 
certain political outcomes or practices. For Campbell in the US these practices include 
the McCarthy trials and the Cold War in general, for Waever and Europe the creation 
of European institutions, and for Burke the transportation of criminals and other 
miscreants that formed the basis of the new colony of Australia. In each case, what 
this Paper would term the discursive construction of identities ascribed to the ‘other’, 
and by default relationally to the self, made possible certain courses of action in terms 
of how the state would deal with this other. The argument in relation to the EU is 
whether or not the EU is undergoing a transformation in it’s identity as global actor as 
it turns outward and if the memory of a dysfunctional past recedes as a legitimising 
narrative for action what takes its place?10 
 In terms of the possible answers to this question two issues need to be 
addressed; the first relates to whether or not identity is necessarily defined in terms of 
a radical other and the second relates to the role of identity in relation to interests in 
terms of determining policy. In each of the cases outlined above the ‘other’ is defined 
as radically different to the self, the question is whether this form of radical othering 
                                                 
8
 Ole Waever, (1996), ‘European Security Identities’ Journal of Common Market Studies Vol 34 No 1 
p.128 
9
 Anthony Burke (2008) Fear of Security: Australia’s invasion anxiety Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, p.19 
10
 See Thomas Diez (2004) ‘Europe’s other and the return of Geopolitics’ Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs Vol 17 No 2 pp.319-335 
 5 
is a necessary feature of the construction of identity. Hansen argues strongly that such 
a proposition would unnecessarily limit the scope of accounts of Foreign Policy that 
investigate the role of identity. She argues that identity can be and is constructed in 
more ambiguous and complex constructions of difference in practice and that the 
degree and mode of difference should be a question for research carried out in this 
vein rather than an a-priori assumption.11 This Paper agrees with this formulation of 
how to deal with identity as a feature of Foreign Policy practice and adopts: 
“an ontology of identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity that one might 
encounter in concrete foreign policies.”12 
 
Thus a range of othering is possible from recognising neighbourly difference to 
outright hostility to alien forms.  
This brings us to the second point of concern: How do constructions of 
identity make possible certain courses of action? As mentioned above McSweeney 
has argued that what he terms the identity thesis overstates the causal role of identity 
in influencing practice: 
“The opportunity is missed to explore the extent to which Yugoslavia, far from 
exemplifying the autonomy of identity as a social fact, is perhaps an outstanding 
example of the manipulation of identity by political elites in an area remarkable 
for its historical forgetfulness”13 
 
McSweeney has identified a number of key points that need to be addressed by 
proponents of this ‘identity thesis’. First to what extent is identity manipulated by 
elites, second does identity exist independently of such manipulation, thirdly what 
role does identity play in making possible political action, and finally he raises the 
point of historical forgetfulness which lies at the heart of much of national identity 
constructions. The first two are related points that identity does not exist as a social 
                                                 
11
 See Lene Hansen, (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War London 
Routledge, p.38-41 
12
 Ibid. p. 41 
13
 Bill McSweeney  (1996) “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School” in Review of 
International Studies Vol 22 No 1, p.87 
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fact and to some extent political elites are responsible for manipulating identity 
narratives to pursue pre-chosen political ends. Underlying these two related points is 
McSweeney’s proposition that interests exist independently of claims of identity and 
that the latter is largely a product of the former, or at least that proponents of the 
identity thesis need to take such a proposition seriously and give reasonable grounds 
for rejecting it. Fierke argues that there is more ambiguity to McSweeney’s position: 
“McSweeney emphasizes the failure of identity theorists to take interests 
seriously, and sometimes suggests that the latter are prior to identity. But the 
notion that leaders and others are always ‘jostling’ with the two reinforces that 
identity and interests cannot be separated and dealt with as a causal relationship, 
in one direction or another.”14 
 
Rather what she terms a constitutive discourse analysis is required so that we examine 
the complex matrix of identities and interests and how they are transformed over 
historical time. In this case neither identity nor interests are given ontological priority 
but the empirical challenge is to explore how the two interact to produce policy 
outcomes. The example she gives is relates to US foreign policy post-9/11: 
“while the American interest in invading Iraq preceded the attacks of 11 
September 2001, the change in identity, or the consolidation of identity rendered 
by the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, made the invasion in 
2003 possible.”15 
 
In other words, it was the interplay of identity and interests after 9/11 that produced 
necessary enabling conditions for the invasion of Iraq.  
 This brings us to the third point – what role does identity play in making 
political action possible? In Fierke’s example the construction of 9/11 in terms of an 
attack against American national identity as articulated by the administration created 
one of the conditions of possibility for the invasion of Iraq. Hansen uses a similar 
argument in relation to the divergent identity discourses proposed by Las Casas and 
                                                 
14
 Karin Fierke (2007) Critical Approaches to International Security Polity, Cambridge p.81 
15
 Ibid. p81 
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Cortés in Todorov’s account of their encounter with native Americans. In both cases 
the identity ascribed to the natives was one of ‘savages’ and both Las Casas and 
Cortés shared an interest in the incorporation of the new lands to Christendom and the 
Spanish empire. However for Cortés the term ‘savage’ equated with non-human and 
therefore implied that the ‘savages’ should and could be annihilated whereas for Las 
Casas the term ‘savage’ was constructed to include the natives as humans and 
therefore capable of conversion and redemption.16 Thus the interplay of identity 
discourses and interests has the potential to produce radically different results that go 
beyond mere manipulation of identity for the pursuit of pre-given interests. In the 
European case, as discussed in relation to Waever above, the narrative of othering 
relating to Europe’s past has enabled the strengthening and deepening of cooperative 
European institutions and enlargement post-1989. But this narrative was largely 
inward looking, as the EU emerges as a potential global actor what kind of identity is 
emerging from the practice of security in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond? 
Before turning to examine the EU as a security actor in more detail we will first 
address the other side of the identity/security nexus. 
What is Security? 
It has become a commonplace to suggest that how security should be defined 
has been debated ad nauseum in the aftermath of the Cold War. Baldwin even goes so 
far as to suggest that redefining security has become something of a “cottage 
industry.”17 However he goes on to reject the proposition that security has become an 
‘essentially contested concept’ in Gallie’s sense. Rather, he argues, it is the referent to 
which security properly applies that has become contested in the post Cold War era. 
                                                 
16
 Hansen, op cit. p42-3 
17
 Davd A. Baldwin (1997) “The concept of security” in Review of International Studies Vol 23, p.5 
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Instead Baldwin argues for a definition of security, following Wolfers, that suggests 
security is: 
“a low probability of damage to acquired values”18 
Following from that, the question is what acquired values are properly the domain of 
security and how do we define the level of probability? Thus although security as a 
concept is not contested in the sense Gallie intended, being neither appraisive nor 
actually contested19, accepting this proposition does not get us very far in 
understanding what security is in a political sense or rather, and more pertinent to this 
paper what it means to claim something is a security issue in terms of the identity of 
the actor(s) involved. 
In order to address this, we can turn to the Copenhagen School. This school’s 
approach to security can be situated within the broadening of security after the Cold 
War. For the Copenhagen School, security is the product of a social process through 
which a particular issue or set of issues is ‘securitized’ via a speech-act naming a 
particular issue as a security issue.20 The concept of security, conceived as a low 
probability of damage to acquired values, is less important than the referent – that is 
the definition of the values that need to be protected. This conceptualisation of how 
security works in practice seems to suggest that the potential for something to be a 
security issue is almost infinitely broad. For the Copenhagen school what is 
interesting in securitizing acts is the attendant practices that are deemed to be justified 
once an issue has been successful transported into the realm of security.21 However, 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. p13 and passim, see also Arnold Wolfers (1952) “ ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous 
Symbol” in Political Science Quarterly Vol 67 No 4, pp. 481-502 
19
 See Baldwin, 1997, op. cit. passim for discussion 
20
 See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap De Wilde (1998) Security: A new framework for analysis, 
London: Lynne Rienner. Chapter 1 
21
 Ibid. 
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constraints are place by the theory in terms of what may or may not be properly 
considered to be effective securitization: 
“As a speech-act, securitisation has a specific structure which in practice limits 
the theoretically unlimited nature of ‘security.’ These constraints operate along 
three lines. First…in practice it is structured by the differential capacity of 
actors to make socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which 
these claims can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing 
by the relevant audience, and by the empirical factors…to which these actors 
can make reference…the claims that are likely to be made, the forms in which 
they can be made, the objects to which they refer, and the social positions from 
which they can be effectively spoken are usually deeply ‘sedimented’…finally 
empirical contexts and claims…provide crucial resources and referents upon 
which actors can draw in attempting to securitize a given issue”22 
 
Thus any study of securitization needs to take into account both the internal logic and 
consistency of securitizing speech-acts and the context external to that act including 
events and sedimented discourses and institutions. Crucial to the success or otherwise 
of such acts is the role of the audience in receiving and accepting that a particular 
issue be securitized. 
 However, the Copenhagen School has been criticised, and correctly so in my 
view, for under-developing its theory of audiences and how or when a securitizing act 
is deemed to be or is likely to be successful.23 This is particularly problematic given 
that, as Hansen has noted: 
“ ‘Security’, as defined by the Copenhagen School, is not only about survival, it 
is, as a general rule, about collective survival”24 
 
For Buzan et al. a securitising speech act must follow the security form or the 
grammar of security. This involves the construction of a plot that identifies something 
as an existential threat, a point of no return looming that demands some form of 
                                                 
22
 Michael C Williams (2003) “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics” in 
International Studies Quarterly Vol 47 No 4, p.513-4 
23
 See for discussion Matt McDonald “Securitization and  the Construction of Security” in European 
Journal of International Relations Vol 14 No 4, 2008, pp.563-587; Holger Stritzel, (2007) ‘Towards a 
theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’ European Journal of International Relations Vol 13 
No 3, pp.357-383; and Thierry Balzacq “The three faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience 
and Context” in European Journal of International Relations Vol 11 No 2, 2005, pp.171-201 
24
 Lene Hansen “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma” in Millennium: Journal of 
InternationalStudies Vol 29 No 2, 2000, p.290.  
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action, and a possible way of dealing with this threat. The success of such a speech-
act depends upon two external conditions – the position of the securitizing actor in 
terms of her credibility, social capital and/or official position and secondly, the threat 
itself: 
“It is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be 
referred to that are generally threatening”25 
 
However for such an act to be successful, the securitizing move needs to be accepted 
by the audience which in turn is dependent, according to Balzacq, on three facilitating 
conditions – the audience, context and securitizing agent. For the audience we need to 
be aware of its frame of reference, how it perceives the securitizing actor, and its 
ability to influence or permit the actor’s actions. In other words does it have a formal 
or moral role in facilitating the security actions. In terms of context, Balzacq refers to 
the zeitgeist and the immediate situation that the audience finds itself in and through 
which it interprets the securitiser’s arguments. And finally, the securitizing actor must 
be able to use the appropriate words and frames of reference to convince an 
audience.26 A further concern in this regard is, as pointed out by Roe, that this 
relationship between actor and audience is what precisely the audience is being asked 
to accept. Is it merely to accept that a particular thing is a threat or that: 
“given that this is a threat, this is what I propose we do about it”27 
This differentiation between the acceptance of something as a threat and the 
acceptance of the proposed action adds an important nuance to the securitization 
framework in that it allows audiences, or parts of audiences, to accept that an issue is 
                                                 
25
 Buzan et al, op. cit. 1998 p.33 
26
 Balzacq, op. cit., 2005 p.192 
27
 Paul Roe (2008), ‘Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s 
decision to invade Iraq’ Security Dialogue Vol 39 No 6, p.622 
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a security threat but to argue that it is best dealt with through other means.28 Such a 
distinction allows us to explore debates that occur within an accepted security frame 
on the possible course of action available to deal with the securitized threat.  
Thus for an adequate account of securitization we need as outlined by Stritzel 
a more “comprehensive awareness of the existence of social sphere.”29 In similar 
terms Hughes argues that: 
“security is conceived as inescapably political, that it ultimately resides in the 
perception of an audience and has little to do with the avoidance of harm. 
Analysis then is about ‘who can ‘do’ security in the name of what?”30 
 
However in order to understand how a particular securitization is successful we need 
to go beyond the internal logic of the speech act itself and examine the context in 
which the act occurs in order to explore  the nascent identity invoked and to a degree 
constructed by securitizing speech acts and the practices which they enable. This 
paper aims to: 
“focus more on the understanding or discourse of security underpinning 
particular representations and practices rather than the act of ‘securitizing’”31 
 
And then to draw out the implications of these practices for the nature of the EU’s 
security identity. 
The EU as a Security Actor 
Before turning to discuss the cases at hand, a further point needs to be made regarding 
the appropriateness of seeking to examine or establish even an emergent security 
identity for the EU as a global actor. Much of the literature on security and identity 
understandably focuses on the national level, with US foreign policy particularly 
                                                 
28
 Ibid. p.622 and Ronald R Krebs & Patrick Thaddeus Jackson “Twisting tongues and Twisting arm: 
the power of political rhetoric” in European Journal of International Relations Vol 13 No 1, 2007, 
pp.35-66 
29
 Strizel, op. cit. 2007, p.365 
30
  Bryn Hughes, (2007) ‘Securitizing Iraq: The Bush Administration’s Social Construction of Security’ 
Global Change, Peace and Security Vol 19 No 2, p.87 
31
 Matt McDonald, op. cit., 2008 p.582 
 12 
prominent. The question is to what extent can a similar analysis be extended to a 
complex multilateral institution such as the European Union, particularly an argument 
that seeks to suggest that EU security identity is not solely constituted by nor 
reducible to the sum of its member state parts. Indeed, this diversity of opinion is also 
reflected in the debate on whether or not the EU is gaining the strategic coherence to 
become an effective military actor with strong arguments on both sides.32 Likewise 
Burgess has argued that we need to speak of European Securities rather than a 
European security identity, albeit though these are rooted in: 
“the presumption of a distinct set of European values…that… are to be 
defended; indeed, defending Europe is identical to defending these values.”33 
 
Picking up from the above discussion, the question then is what are these values and 
how are they to be defined. Is Diez correct to identify a shift away from the temporal 
othering of Europe’s past towards a more geopolitical and culturally rooted sense of 
self and other?34 Or do European leaders, following Manganas argument as to why 
Europe’s response to 9/11 was less robust than their American counterparts, recognise 
that: 
“It would be reckless to abandon this [perpetual peace] narrative in the name of 
fighting terrorism. Perhaps something nastier lurks beneath the mythologies of 
peace. Europeans know this very well. And perhaps this is why they are so 
scared to let the narrative of perpetual peace go.”35 
 
In order to examine this question we need to think about European security identity 
not just as the product of competition among member states but also as constituted by 
                                                 
32
 See Sten Rynning (2003) ‘The European Union: Towards a strategic culture?’ Security Dialogue Vol 
34 No 4,  p.480 
33
 J. Peter Burgess, (2009) ‘The is No European Security, Only European Securities’, Cooperation and 
Conflict Vol 44 No 3, p.317 
34
 See Diez, op. cit. 2004, passim 
35
 Nicholas Managanas (2007) ‘Europe is Scared…The Narrative of Perpetual Peace’ Culture, Theory 
& Critique Vol 48 No 1, p.49 
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it’s interactions with the wider world.36 Therefore this paper aims to take seriously the 
challenge by the C.A.S.E. collective to re-examine the question of European identity: 
“where identities are not givens and the nature and outcome of the processes at 
stake are not taken for granted. The aim would be to reflect on how identities 
are re-produced through social practices and how these practices are 
transformed, categorized and labelled as European”37 
 
The challenge then is to treat foreign policy practice as both constitutive of as well as 
constituted by the emergent EU security identity.  
 This picture is further complicated by the nature of a European security 
identity itself, which as Waever has outlined exists as a concept in discussions of the 
EU’s role in security affairs. He dismisses the argument that this is merely a reflection 
of a weak institutionalism and instead argues that its presence is implicated in the way 
in which the European project as a whole seeks to establish its political identity.38 
Therefore we end up with a complex situation where: 
“identity cannot be something we ‘have’ as a thing, or some inner quality of our 
own which we are called upon to realize in optimum purity. Instead we have to 
view identity simultaneously as something impossible to fill, always incomplete 
due to the presence of the outside in the inside, but also as defined by this 
impossibility.”39 
 
European security identity, then isn’t something fixed nor is it readily definable rather 
it is best viewed as the product of a process of becoming that is never complete, never 
closed but always sought out and pursued. Until the 1990’s this pursuit has largely 
been focussed inwards on further integration, it then shifted Eastwards towards the 
post-Warsaw Pact and former Soviet emerging democracies.40 In the 21st century this 
                                                 
36
 See George Christou, Stuart Croft, Michela Ceccorulli & Sonia Lucarelli (2010) ‘European Union 
security governance: putting the ‘security’ back in’ European Security Vol 19 No 3, p.346-7 
37
 C.A.S.E Collective (2006) ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A networked manifesto’ 
Security Dialogue Vol 37 No 4, p.472 
38
 See Waever, op cit., 1996 p.124 
39
 Ibid. p.127 
40
 See Atsuko Higashino (2004) ‘For the sake of ‘peace and security’? The role of security in the 
European Union Enlargement Eastwards’ Cooperation and Conflict Vol 39 No 4, pp.347-368 
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focus has increasingly shifted beyond the immediate European neighbourhood, the 
question is what kind of emergent security identity does this latest shift represent? 
The EU as an External Actor: EUFOR-Chad and EU-NAVFOR 
As discussed above, the emergence of an EU security identity has been deeply 
entangled with debates about the depth and nature of European cooperation. A 
number of cross-cutting divisions need to be taken into account in relation to the 
process of reforming the EU as a global rather than a regional actor. We’ve already 
discussed the divergence between optimists and pessimists in relation to the 
possibility of a coherent EU strategic identity. A second dynamic is the debate 
between the nature of that identity, namely, would it continue to be defined against a 
fractious and violent European past or would it turn to a more geopolitical or even 
cultural base as the memory of war recedes in the new generation of European 
leaders. A third dynamic, this time specifically related to matters conventionally 
considered to be the subject of security, is the split between those who view NATO as 
the appropriate forum for developing the ESDP and those who seek to construct a 
distinct European alternative. It is in this context that the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) emerged. The ESS was drafted as part of the ongoing process of defining the 
external role of the Union. For some it was seen as a counterpoint to the NSS that set 
out a distinct European approach to the question of security and it to some extent it 
was, but it was also a reflection of the  internal strains and negotiations that marked 
the debate over the Iraq war and the longer standing debate that had resisted the 
creation of a separate, if complementary to NATO, European defence community. 
Therefore the EU missions in Chad and the Gulf of Aden will reflect the product of 
these tensions in their design and delivery but also go some to answering the 
 15 
questions raised by the debates highlighted above, even if this is as an unintended 
consequence of the reality of EU missions abroad. 
 The EU mission is Chad is worth examining for a number of reasons, it 
represents a good example of the kind of out of region mission identified in the 
European Security Strategy that, although it doesn’t directly affect EU interests, 
should concern the Union as part of its broad security policy.41 It also demonstrates 
the complex process through which an issue emerges on the security agenda of the EU 
and the interaction between the national, regional and global level. France were 
pushing for involvement in Chad from as early as 2007. France, as the former colonial 
power, were to prove to be both the engine and main complicating factor of the 
mission.42 Indeed, it was French prompting at the Security Council that played a large 
part in passing UNSC 1778 under which the mission ultimately deployed.43 The 
structure of the mission which was placed under a commander from the Irish Defence 
Forces, General Pat Nash, was designed to try to minimise the perception of overt 
partiality and particularly too much French influence. Despite this the perception 
remained complicated. As Ploch noted: 
“At least one rebel group warned that it considered the EU force a ‘foreign 
occupational army’ because it included French forces, whom the rebels did not 
see as neutral.”44 
 
Indeed, it is in this light that we can understand the connection between the rebel 
assault on the Chadian capital, N’djamena, immediately prior to the deployment of 
EUFOR-Chad as the rebels sought to press home their advantage prior to the 
                                                 
41
 See European Union Security Strategy, 2003 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ 
42
 Alexander Matelaar (2008) ‘The Strategic planning of EU Military Operations – The Case of 
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA’ IES Working Paper 5/2008, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, p.10 
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deployment of what they perceived as reinforcements for the Chadian government.45 
Likewise this perceived lack of neutrality hindered the mission’s ability to protect aid 
groups.46 Furthermore, at the end of the bridging mission many of the EUFOR forces 
simply ‘re-hatted’ to serve under the new UN mission, MINURCAT, which meant 
that the taint of impartiality continued to hinder international efforts complicated 
further by the reduced capacity for the use of force under the UN mission.47 In an 
editorial, the then EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solano argues that the Chad mission demonstrates that: 
“the EU has become a global provider of security and stability”48 
Although this statement does give an insight to a particular view of the EU’s 
emerging role in the world, it is generally accepted as being something of an 
overstatement of the achievements of EUFOR-Chad. Rather, as Vines has noted: 
“It is probably more accurate to credit this EUFOR operation with increasing 
European learning and coordination on how to conduct such a bridging exercise 
successfully than with fulfilling a meaningful humanitarian mandate”49 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the mission serves to highlight the problems of carving 
out a distinct EU security identity separate from its more powerful member states. 
EUFOR-Chad (and even the UN-led MINURCAT) continued to be dogged by the 
perception that they were French inspired, French led missions rather than 
representing the emergence of new global actor. One reason for this is the ad-hoc and 
limited nature of the mission, the lack of a clear strategic vision that could explain 
why the EU was in Chad in 2008 and not in one of any number of other hotspots 
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either regionally or global. This lack will be returned to in the conclusion but first we 
turn to the other case in hand – EUNAVFOR – ‘Operation Atalanta. ’ 
 Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a complex security issue. On the one hand it 
has a negative economic effect by raising the cost of transporting goods through a 
vital global trade route. There is also the potential link to such piracy as either a 
source of funding or tactical innovation for terrorist organisations such as Al-Shabab 
and Al-Qaeda.50 While on the other hand, the ongoing humanitarian aspects of the 
crisis demand a global response and securitizing the problem on the above terms also 
obscures the role of external actors in destabilising the Somali economy and polity via 
illegal dumping in Somali waters, destroying fish stocks51, and the destruction of the 
Al-Barakaat informal transmission network as part of the financial war on terror.52 In 
other words, the Somali situation is precisely the kind of nuanced emergency the ESS 
anticipated as facing the EU in the 21st Century. However a complicating factor in the 
response was the lack of attention to Naval aspects of the ESDP prior to 2008, albeit 
with a backdrop of some naval cooperation emerging in a Mediterranean context.53 
The initial EU response was the creation of a coordination cell, EU NAVCO, to 
enable coordination and support of surveillance and protection activities in the region. 
This was subsequently extended to an additional EU naval force to be deployed in the 
region, EUNAVFOR – Operation Atalanta.54 The force operates under a UN mandate 
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from resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846 & 185155 and has had it’s mission extended 
twice by the EU, first until December 2010 and then for a further 2 years until 
December 2012.56 The mission also serves a dual purpose: to protect vulnerable 
international shipping from piracy and to protect ships operating under the World 
Food Programme mission in Somalia and the African Union’s reconstruction mission, 
AMISOM.57 The EU however is not acting alone in the region, NATO has a separate 
but parallel mission ongoing as do a number of other states including the USA, Russia 
and China.58 Thus, as Germond argues: 
“as with previous ESDP Missuins, the EU’s decision to launch Atalanta was 
clearly motivated by common perceptions of not just the interests but also the 
grandeur of the EU and the affirmation of its values.”59 
 
The importance of EUNAVFOR may not then be for what it achieves but rather for 
what it represents in terms of the emerging role of the EU as a global actor. 
Preliminary Conclusions and further research 
Although the above discussion is very much a first draft, some preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn. The first is that more work needs to be done to link 
together the various strands of research examining EU Homeland Security and the 
increasing global aspects of EU security policy. Extending to but not limited to other 
aspects of EU security policy, particularly aspects of migration policy and counter-
terrorism.60 The processes shifting the EU from a temporal to a geopolitical form of 
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‘othering’ are not just externally oriented but also linked to policing what it means to 
be European within the boundaries of the EU. Secondly, as highlighted in the case of 
Chad in particular, the need for a coherent strategy at the EU level is required if the 
EU is ever to be seen as more than an extension of the interests of its more powerful 
members. The EU successfully reconciled itself to eastern expansion in the 1990’s, 
the question now turns to what kind of Actor is the EU going to be in its neighbouring 
regions whether that is the former Soviet Union, the Middle East or the Maghreb. Or 
indeed beyond its regional role in Sub-Saharan Africa. ‘Operation Atalanta’ points to 
a more robust EU role than in the past, but one that is not entirely devoid of 
humanitarian sensibilities, the question is whether the EU can (or wishes to) 
successfully resist the increasingly securitised view of the Somalian piracy problem. 
In light of recent events in the Maghreb from the outside and in Ireland and Greece 
from the inside, the time is short for the EU to find itself a voice that would allow it to 
pursue a unique line in global politics, failure to seize this window of opportunity may 
also have repercussions for the EU project as a whole. 
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